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BIG DATA AND DUE PROCESS: TOWARD A 
FRAMEWORK TO REDRESS PREDICTIVE 
PRIVACY HARMS 
KATE CRAWFORD* 
JASON SCHULTZ** 
Abstract: The rise of “Big Data” analytics in the private sector poses new 
challenges for privacy advocates. Through its reliance on existing data and 
predictive analysis to create detailed individual profiles, Big Data has explod-
ed the scope of personally identifiable information (“PII”). It has also effec-
tively marginalized regulatory schema by evading current privacy protections 
with its novel methodology. Furthermore, poor execution of Big Data meth-
odology may create additional harms by rendering inaccurate profiles that 
nonetheless impact an individual’s life and livelihood. To respond to Big Da-
ta’s evolving practices, this Article examines several existing privacy regimes 
and explains why these approaches inadequately address current Big Data 
challenges. This Article then proposes a new approach to mitigating predictive 
privacy harms—that of a right to procedural data due process. Although cur-
rent privacy regimes offer limited nominal due process-like mechanisms, a 
more rigorous framework is needed to address their shortcomings. By examin-
ing due process’s role in the Anglo-American legal system and building on 
previous scholarship about due process for public administrative computer 
systems, this Article argues that individuals affected by Big Data should have 
similar rights to those in the legal system with respect to how their personal 
data is used in such adjudications. Using these principles, this Article analo-
gizes a system of regulation that would provide such rights against private Big 
Data actors. 
INTRODUCTION 
Big Data analytics have been widely publicized in recent years, with 
many in the business and science worlds focusing on how large datasets can 
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offer new insights into previously intractable problems.1 At the same time, 
Big Data poses new challenges for privacy advocates. Unlike previous 
computational models that exploited known sources of personally identifia-
ble information (“PII”) directly, such as behavioral targeting,2 Big Data has 
radically expanded the range of data that can be personally identifying.3 By 
primarily analyzing metadata, such as a set of predictive and aggregated 
findings, or by combining previously discrete data sets, Big Data approach-
es are not only able to manufacture novel PII, but often do so outside the 
purview of current privacy protections.4 Existing regulatory schema appear 
incapable of keeping pace with these advancing business norms and prac-
tices. 
Personal harms emerge from the inappropriate inclusion and predictive 
analysis of an individual’s personal data without their knowledge or express 
consent. For example, in 2012, a well-publicized New York Times article 
revealed that the retail chain Target had used data mining techniques to pre-
dict which female customers were pregnant, even if they had not yet an-
nounced it publicly.5 This activity resulted in the unauthorized disclosure of 
personal information to marketers.6 In essence, Target’s predictive analytics 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Philosophy of Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, at A23 
(highlighting Big Data’s potential); Strata 2013 Is a Wrap, STRATA CONF.: MAKING DATA WORK, 
http://strataconf.com/strata2013, archived at http://perma.cc/8KYZ-FPGQ (last visited Dec. 2, 2013) 
(documenting an internationally recognized Big Data conference). Organizations may use Big 
Data to combine and analyze large datasets to discover correlations and make predictions. For 
example, the United Postal Service collects vehicle data from sensors on each of its many delivery 
trucks and uses predictive algorithms to delegate preventive maintenance—resulting in lower 
maintenance costs and ensuring timely delivery. Greg Satell, Yes, Big Data Can Solve Real World 
Problems, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2013, 1:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2013/12/03/
yes-big-data-can-solve-real-world-problems/, archived at http://perma.cc/VSW4-QVG3. In addi-
tion, Big Data has had a positive impact on the health care industry, with the shift toward “infor-
mational research that analyzes large data and biological sample sets” leading to “significant dis-
coveries, the development of new therapies, and a remarkable improvement in health care and 
public health.” See Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1623, 
1631 (2013) (quoting INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY 
RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 113 (Sharyl J. Nass et 
al. eds., 2009)). 
 2 See Elspeth A. Brotherton, Big Brother Gets a Makeover: Behavioral Targeting and the 
Third-Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 558 (2012) (describing “behavioral targeting” as “an 
online advertising technique designed to deliver specific, targeted advertisements to Internet users 
based on their perceived interests,” and observing that companies are able to do this “by using 
sophisticated technology that tracks and gathers information about users’ online activity). 
 3 See Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA 
PRIVACY L. 74, 75–76 (2013). 
 4 See id. at 76–77, 82–83; Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A 
Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 65–66 (2012), http://www.stanfordlaw
review.org/online/privacy-paradox/big-data, archived at http://perma.cc/U6ZQ-PSK6. 
 5 Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, § 6 (Magazine), at 30. 
 6 Id. 
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“guessed” that a customer was pregnant and disclosed her name to their 
marketing department, manufacturing PII about her instead of collecting it 
directly.7 Although the customers likely knew that Target collected data on 
their individual purchases, it is doubtful that many considered the risk that 
Target would use data analytics to create such personal customer models to 
send advertising material to homes. These types of harms do not necessarily 
fall within the conventional invasion of privacy boundaries, but such harms 
are still derived from collecting and using information that centers on an 
individual’s data behaviors. We call these “predictive privacy harms.” 
This Article confronts the tension between the powerful potential bene-
fits of Big Data and the resulting predictive privacy harms. Part I discusses 
the nature of “Big Data science” and how personal information can be 
amassed and analyzed.8 It then discusses the nature of predictive privacy 
harms and why traditional privacy protections are insufficient to address the 
risks posed by Big Data’s use of personal information.9 In Part II, this Arti-
cle recounts the Anglo-American history of procedural due process and the 
role it has played in both systems of adjudication and separation of pow-
ers.10 Part II then makes the case for why procedural due process principles 
may be an appropriate source to draw from to address the risks of predictive 
privacy harms.11 Finally, Part III looks at the procedural due process litera-
ture and suggests ways to analogize a similar framework for private sector 
Big Data systems.12 
I. PREDICTIVE PRIVACY HARMS AND THE MARGINALIZATION OF 
TRADITIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
A. What Is Big Data and Why All the Hype? 
Knowledge is invariably a matter of degree: you cannot put your finger 
upon even the simplest datum and say “this we know”. In the growth 
and construction of the world we live in, there is no one stage, and no 
one aspect, which you can take as the foundation. 
—T.S. Eliot13 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Id. 
 8 See infra notes 14–19 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 20–88 and accompanying text.  
 10 See infra notes 90–172 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 126–129, 145–147, 153–172 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 173–201 and accompanying text. 
 13 T.S. ELIOT, KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF F.H. BRADLEY 151 
(1964). 
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“Big Data” is a generalized, imprecise term that refers to the use of 
large data sets in data science and predictive analytics.14 In practice, the 
term encompasses three aspects of data magnification and manipulation.15 
First, it refers to technology that maximizes computational power and algo-
rithmic accuracy.16 Second, it describes types of analyses that draw on a 
range of tools to clean and compare data.17 Third, it promotes the belief that 
large data sets generate results with greater truth, objectivity, and accura-
cy.18 The promise of Big Data’s ability to analyze data and provide novel 
insights has led to profound investment in, consideration of, and excitement 
about Big Data’s power to solve problems in numerous disciplines and 
business arenas.19 
B. Big Data’s Predictive Privacy Harms 
Alongside its great promise, Big Data presents serious privacy prob-
lems. It gathers its contents from a myriad of online user interactions and 
infrastructure sensors, ranging from online transactions, search queries, and 
health records to communication networks, electric grids, and mobile 
phones.20 Not only are the generated data sets sizable, but they also often 
contain very intimate aspects of individuals’ lives.21 This Section begins by 
discussing the expanded scope and quantity of personal information vulner-
able to Big Data and concludes by illustrating Big Data’s potential harms of 
enabling discriminatory housing practices, exposing sensitive health infor-
mation, and facilitating predictive policing.22 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age 
of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 240 (2013) (defining Big Data to include 
personal data generated from a variety of sources). 
 15 See danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a 
Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 663 (2012). 
Big Data raises numerous critical questions about all three of these uses. Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 
385, 388 (2012) (citing JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE 
NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 1 (2011), http://www.
mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation, archived 
at http://perma.cc/7XAZ-QF9J). 
 20 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 14, at 240 (noting other sources of Big Data such as email, 
video, clickstream, logs, social networking interactions, global positioning satellites, roads, bridg-
es, homes, and clothing). 
 21 See Jay Stanley, Eight Problems with “Big Data,” FREE FUTURE, (Apr. 25, 2012, 3:06 
PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/eight-problems-big-data, archived at http://
perma.cc/RF4U-VF8A. 
 22 See infra notes 23–40 and accompanying text (expanded scope); infra notes 41–74 and 
accompanying text (potential harms). 
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The many sources for retrieving and generating data have expanded 
the amount and availability of personal data.23 For example, health data is 
particularly vulnerable; a single breach risks exposing critical information 
from a multitude of patients’ records.24 Furthermore, as one health infor-
mation law scholar observes, data about our online behavior generally—
such as buying an e-book about breast cancer survival or “liking” a disease 
foundation’s Facebook page—can also reveal information about our 
health.25 Even the radio-frequency identification (RFID) chips embedded in 
drug packaging can leave a data “exhaust trail” that links back to infor-
mation that health care providers would normally consider deeply confiden-
tial.26 
Individuals may also offer up health data directly, further risking the 
generation of PII. For example, programs such as the “Blue Button” initia-
tive allow patients to directly download their personal health records. 27 
Once downloaded, many of these records lose the protections afforded to 
them by federal health privacy statutes such as the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 and the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009.28 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting 
the Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 347–50 (2007) (dis-
cussing various means used to compile personal health information, including hackers, foreign 
data processes, public records, and consumer purchase information); see also Nicolas P. Terry, 
Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism 19–21 (Ind. Univ. Robert H. McKinney 
Sch. of Law Research Paper, Paper No. 2013-36, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2320088, archived at http://perma.cc/7LZT-CF2P (noting that this expan-
sion in the health care industry has focused on making this information available to the individual, 
rather than to health care providers). 
 24 See Report Finds Correlation Between Health Data Breaches, Fraud Cases, IHEALTHBEAT 
(Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.ihealthbeat.org/articles/2013/4/30/report-finds-correlation-between-
health-data-breaches-fraud-cases.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/S4AM-ZAKH. 
 25 Terry, supra note 19, at 394. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See Your Health Records: About Blue Button, HEALTHIT.GOV http://www.healthit.gov/
patients-families/blue-button/about-blue-button, archived at http://perma.cc/9S94-4C4P (last vis-
ited Dec. 2, 2013). 
 28 See Terry, supra note 19, at 394. HIPAA enacted a regime of privacy and security regula-
tions for the health care industry that were later augmented by the HITECH Act. See HIPAA, Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 
U.S.C.); HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 226 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.); Thomas R. McLean & Alexander B. McLean, Dependence on Cyber-
scribes—Issues in e-Security, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 59, 90–92 (2013); Jo-Ellyn Sakowitz Klein et 
al., Health Sector Braces for Wide Impact of the New HITECH Omnibus Rule, 25 INTELL. PROP. 
& TECH. L.J. 10, 10 (2013). Recently, an omnibus rule was enacted, overhauling this existing 
regime—and essentially synthesizing and strengthening these protections. Klein et al., supra, at 
10; Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules, 
78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). This new rule sets 
out security standards by which health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers 
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Other self-help health and fitness approaches, such as “Quantified Self” and 
“PatientsLikeMe,” generate data sets that help identify or predict health at-
tributes.29 When these data sets are cross-referenced with traditional health 
information, as Big Data is designed to do, it is possible to generate a de-
tailed picture about a person’s health, including information the person may 
never have disclosed to a health care provider.30 By combining the use of 
these data sets with predictive analytics, Big Data can dramatically increase 
the amount of related data that may be considered private.31 
But these privacy problems go beyond just increasing the amount and 
scope of potentially private information. Based on existing publicly availa-
ble information, Big Data’s processes can generate a predictive model of 
what has a high probability of being PII, essentially imagining an individu-
al’s data. For example, in the New York Times article about Target predicting 
pregnancy, Target had never collected data showing that any particular fe-
male customer was pregnant—a fact that most people would almost assur-
edly consider to be very personal and intimate information.32 Instead, Target 
predicted this information.33 Furthermore, the prediction was just as person-
ally sensitive as if it had been collected or shared inappropriately.34 Target 
also used the predictive privacy information in a similarly personally sensi-
tive manner by exploiting it for marketing purposes. 35 Nevertheless, be-
cause it did not collect the information from any first or third party, Target 
had no obligation under current privacy regimes to give notice to, or gather 
consent from its customers in the same way that direct collection protocols 
require.36 In the context of health information, this is likely to lead to a 
                                                                                                                           
must comply. Id. at 5567. Such standards include administrative, physical, and technical safe-
guards to the electronic storage of protected health information. Id. at 5567–69. 
 29 See Terry, supra note 23, at 19–21. “Quantified Self” is a program that allows patients to 
track their activity and other health inputs such as heart rate and oxygen levels to improve their 
lifestyles. See Quantified Self: Self Knowledge Through Numbers, QUANTIFIED SELF, http://www.
quantifiedself.com, archived at http://perma.cc/VUZ2-XBJN (last visited Jan. 15, 2014). Similar-
ly, “PatientsLikeMe” allows those living with health conditions such as cancer and diabetes to 
share information about their treatment and symptoms in order to aggregate information and pro-
vide suggestions for possible steps. See About Us, PATIENTSLIKEME, http://www.patientslikeme.
com/about, archived at http://perma.cc/E35S-8AYZ (last visited Jan. 15, 2014). 
 30  Counting Every Moment, ECONOMIST (May 3, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/
21548493, archived at http://perma.cc/YW74-Z44P. 
 31 See generally Paul Schwartz & Dan Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept 
of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 (2001) (arguing for a more flexi-
ble approach to PII that tracks the “risk of identification” along a spectrum and attributing the 
shortcomings of the current PII approach to the increase of PII generated by Big Data). 
 32 Duhigg, supra note 5, § 6 (Magazine), at 30. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id.; see infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text (discussing current regulations of privacy 
information). 
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surge in the use of Big Data to create “surrogate” health data because of its 
less regulated nature.37 
Moreover, the nature of Big Data’s dynamic analytical tools is such 
that the privacy problems of predictive algorithms are often themselves un-
predictable, and their effects may not even be fully understood by their pro-
grammers.38 As computer scientists have shown, in many contexts, it is im-
possible to guarantee differential privacy when using a learning algorithm 
that draws data from a continuous distribution.39 In other words, we cannot 
know in advance exactly when a learning algorithm will predict PII about 
an individual; therefore, we cannot predict where and when to assemble 
privacy protections around that data. When a pregnant teenager is shopping 
for vitamins, could she predict that any particular visit or purchase would 
trigger a retailer’s algorithms to flag her as a pregnant customer? And at 
what point would it have been appropriate to give notice and request her 
consent? 
So how exactly does one define this type of privacy problem? The fol-
lowing examples highlight the predictive privacy harms of Big Data.40 Not 
only does Big Data’s use have the potential to circumvent existing anti-
discrimination regulations, but it may also lead to privacy breaches in health 
care and law enforcement. 
1. Predictive Privacy and Discriminatory Practices 
Predictive privacy harms can manifest as discriminatory practices that 
circumvent current regulations. For decades, there have been laws prohibit-
ing various discriminatory practices. In the real estate industry, for instance, 
such legislation prohibits marketing that excludes renters and buyers who 
fall within racial, gender, or religious categories.41 This legislation works 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Terry, supra note 19, at 391–92. Big Data’s ability to synthesize previously available in-
formation from various datasets similarly threatens privacy by enabling the “re-identification” of 
personal information or identities that have been stripped away. See generally Arvind Narayanan 
& Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-Anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, 2008 IEEE SYMP. ON 
SEC. & PRIVACY 111 (demonstrating via an anonymous Netflix user database that users may be 
identified with as few as five personal attributes); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Re-
sponding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010) (highlight-
ing the ease of re-identifying anonymous datasets, discussing how this harms current privacy law, 
and suggesting solutions). 
 38 Kamalika Chaudhuri & Daniel Hsu, Sample Complexity Bounds for Differentially Private 
Learning, 19 JMLR: WORKSHOP & CONF. PROC. 155, 155–56 (2011). 
 39 Id. 
 40 See infra notes 41–74 and accompanying text. 
 41 See Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006). The Fair Housing Act of 1968 
prohibits the making, printing, or publication of any “notice, statement, or advertisement, with 
respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimina-
tion based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” Id. Further-
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because there are certain moments in the life cycle of housing advertise-
ments that can act as flashpoints for enforcement.42 Enforcers can monitor 
published housing advertisements by particular landlords in specific media 
and check for use of explicit language indicative of discriminatory intent, 
such as “female renters preferred.”43 Enforcement cases involve presenting 
the text of the advertisement to the adjudicator along with other evidence of 
intent.44 
The use of Big Data may allow landlords and real estate companies to 
shift away from general advertising in media outlets and circumvent anti-
discrimination enforcement mechanisms by isolating correlative attributes 
that they can use as a proxy for traits such as race or gender. Such predictive 
practices already occur in other industries with the power of Big Data.45 
This can be partly attributed to Big Data’s ability to generate a detailed pic-
ture of individuals with even discrete online activity, such as “liking” things 
on Facebook.46 For example, in the credit loan industry, federal regulations 
prohibit discrimination in access to credit.47 Despite these regulations, com-
                                                                                                                           
more, § 3604(a) prohibits “otherwise mak[ing] unavailable or deny[ing], a dwelling to any person 
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” Id. § 3604(a). Whether 
using Big Data to generate profiles that de facto discriminate under § 3604(a) would violate 
§ 3604(c) is unknown and presumably unlikely, given the intent requirement. See id. § 3604(c). 
 42 See Stephen Collins, Comment, Saving Fair Housing on the Internet: The Case for Amend-
ing the Communications Decency Act, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1471, 1490–93 (highlighting the de-
cline in § 3604(c)’s effectiveness in preventing housing discrimination and attributing this trend to 
the rise of new technologies for advertising). 
 43 See generally Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(noting that a roommate search service’s requirement for users to disclose sex, sexual orientation, 
and family status may be discriminatory and violative of the Fair Housing Act); Chi. Lawyers’ 
Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that the publication of housing advertisements prohibiting minorities and children may be discrim-
inatory and violative of the Fair Housing Act). 
 44 See generally, e.g., Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 
F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1991) (considering evidence of advertisements that featured predominantly 
white models as discriminatory and liable under § 3604(c)); Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 
995 (2d Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972) (considering 
evidence of newspaper advertisements that described rental as a “white home” as discriminatory 
and liable under § 3604(c)). 
 45 See generally JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY 
IS DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH (2012) (discussing how media, including adver-
tisements and entertainment, uses Big Data to acquire and create individual profiles for consum-
ers). 
 46 See generally Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 81 (2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data/big-data-
small-hands, archived at http://perma.cc/6B9P-VGTL (highlighting Big Data’s power to generate 
highly detailed individual profiles with little social media information); Michael Kosinski, et al., 
Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5802 (2013) (finding that “highly sensitive personal attributes” could be 
predicted with high degrees of success from “Facebook Likes”). 
 47 See Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2012). 
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panies have utilized Big Data models to identify and avoid Internet users 
with low credit scores when posting advertisements for loans.48 
Accordingly, Big Data may eliminate housing suppliers’ need to dis-
close their potentially discriminatory preferences in their advertisements. 
Instead, the housing providers could design an algorithm to predict the rele-
vant PII of potential buyers or renters and advertise the properties only to 
those who fit these profiles. In the housing market, providers may adopt 
these practices and increasingly rely on publicly available personal infor-
mation to generate these profiles. Just as Big Data may be used to prevent 
candidates from seeing loans that might be advantageous to them, housing 
suppliers could potentially use Big Data to discriminate, all while circum-
venting the fair housing laws.49 
Big Data’s ability to discriminate while maneuvering around privacy 
regulations comes from its methodology. Not only can massive amounts of 
online behavior be collected and assessed to compute the probabilities of an 
individual’s particular demographic characteristic, but that predictive analy-
sis can also become a form of PII itself.50 Moreover, this process can predict 
highly intimate information, even if none of the individual pieces of data 
could be defined as PII.51 Although these predictive processes may generate 
an inaccurate characterization, such processes nevertheless create a model 
of possible personal information and associate it with an individual.52 Ac-
cordingly, harms can result regardless of the model’s accuracy. 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Michael Fertik, The Rich See a Different Internet Than the Poor, SCI. AM., (Feb. 18, 2013), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=rich-see-different-internet-than-the-poor, archived 
at http://perma.cc/3PCW-GBDB (stating that if Big Data analysis indicates a poor credit record for 
the user, “you won’t even see a credit offer from leading lending institutions, and you won’t realize 
that loans are available to help you with your current personal or professional priorities”). 
 49 Cf. Alistair Croll, Big Data Is Our Generation’s Civil Rights Issue, and We Don’t Know It, 
SOLVE FOR INTERESTING (July 31, 2012, 12:40 PM), http://solveforinteresting.com/big-data-is-our-
generations-civil-rights-issue-and-we-dont-know-it/, archived at http://perma.cc/D3T-QCW9 (illus-
trating how Big Data can be used for discriminatory purposes); Alistair Croll, Followup on Big Data 
and Civil Rights, SOLVE FOR INTERESTING (Aug. 28, 2012, 11:29 AM), http://solveforinteresting.
com/followup-on-big-data-and-civil-rights/, archived at http://perma.cc/ZP9K-NGFC (same). 
 50 See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 14, at 256 (suggesting that Target had generated sensi-
tive personal information by using Big Data’s predictive analytics when it determined that a teen 
was pregnant). 
 51 See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 31, at 1841–45 (explaining how Big Data can transfer 
previously anonymous data into PII through re-identification). 
 52 See Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy, and It’s Not Fair, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 35, 36–38 (2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data/
its-not-privacy-and-its-not-fair, archived at http://perma.cc/35X-E9XS; Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, 
Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big Data Threatens Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 65, 69 (2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data/pre
diction-preemption-presumption, archived at http://perma.cc/CXU5-54V2. 
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2. Health Analytics and Personalized Medicine 
As one noted health law scholar has written, many consider technology 
pivotal to addressing issues in health care because technology’s rapid pro-
gress has facilitated affordable and easy access to research advancements 
and patient records.53 Given these benefits, the use of Big Data in health 
care seems particularly attractive. 54 Some even predict that it will bring 
forth “personalized medicine” —analyzing large data sets of patient infor-
mation to make diagnostic predictions and treatment suggestions.55 None-
theless, similar issues to those previously discussed arise when Big Data is 
used to address health problems. 
For example, Big Data’s methodology may harm the privacy of health in-
formation. Such personalized models would require Big Data practices to ac-
cess very detailed personal health information about an individual as well as 
thousands of others’ profiles for comparison.56 The generated predictions and 
treatment suggestions would be associated with the individual in the same way 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Terry, supra note 19, at 385. Terry notes: 
Technology, not surprisingly, is viewed as holding the solution [to rising health care 
costs] because “[a]dvances have made vast computational power affordable and 
widely available, while improvements in connectivity have allowed information to 
be accessible in real time virtually anywhere” affording “the potential to improve 
health care by increasing the reach of research knowledge, providing access to clini-
cal records when and where needed, and assisting patients and providers in manag-
ing chronic diseases.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting INST. OF MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO 
CONTINUOUSLY LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 112 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2013)). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Narges Bani Asadi, The Personalized Medicine Revolution Is Almost Here, VENTUREBEAT 
(Jan. 27, 2013, 12:23 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2013/01/27/the-personalized-medicine-revolution-
is-almost-here/, archived at http://perma.cc/LJP4-ZL75; Press Release, Dep’t for Bus., Innovation, & 
Skills and Prime Minister’s Office, £30 Million Investment in Health Research Centre to Tackle 
Major Diseases (May 3, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/30-million-investment-in-
health-research-centre-to-tackle-major-diseases (expressing the Prime Minister’s belief in Big Data’s 
promise for health care); see also Terry, supra note 19, at 394 (“It will not be long until patient level 
information is combined with large existing data sets [that] will generate far more accurate predictive 
modeling, personalization of care, assessment of quality and value for many more conditions, and 
help providers better manage population health and risk-based reimbursement approaches.” (quoting 
Robert Kocher & Bryan Roberts, Meaningful Use of Health IT Stage 2: The Broader Meaning, 
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 15, 2012, 1:24 PM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/03/15/meaningful-
use-of-health-it-stage-2-the-broader-meaning/, archived at http://perma.cc/8JP7-K7U8). 
 56 Sarah A. Downey, How to Use 23andMe Without Giving Up Your Genetic Privacy, VEN-
TUREBEAT (Sept. 20, 2013, 10:19 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2013/09/20/how-to-use-23andme-
without-giving-up-your-genetic-privacy/, archived at http://perma.cc/367S-ZZHB. See generally 
23ANDME, http://www.23andme.com, archived at http://perma.cc/MF5Z-4B2H (last visited Dec. 
2, 2013) (providing an example of a genetic testing company that relies on Big Data methodology); 
PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT, http://www.personalgenomes.org, archived at http://perma.cc/C8SF-
4AFW (last visited Dec. 2, 2013) (providing an example of a large-scale personal genomics study 
that relies on Big Data methodology). 
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as PII. As one noted health scholar emphasizes, HIPAA/HITECH’s security and 
privacy standards for electronic health records apply to entities of health plans, 
health care clearinghouses, and health care providers; in contrast, it is unclear 
whether these regulations will apply to organizations that are not so character-
ized, but who still receive personal health information from individuals or by 
generating it through Big Data.57 Thus, even health information—one of the 
most highly protected types of personal information—will be increasingly vul-
nerable in the context of Big Data and predictive analytics. 
3. Predictive Policing 
Law enforcement agencies throughout the United States are turning to 
predictive policing models of Big Data in the hopes that they will shine in-
vestigative light on unsolved cases or help prevent future crimes.58 This 
model uses the date, time, type, and location of recent crimes and combines 
that data with historical crime data to identify “hot spots” that become the 
focus of officer patrols.59 
Big Data’s ability to analyze large amounts of data may lead to predic-
tive privacy harms for individuals targeted by law enforcement. With Big 
Data, it takes very little to connect time, place, and location with individu-
als, especially when combined with other data sets.60 Moreover, the predic-
tions that these policing algorithms make—that particular geographic areas 
are more likely to have crime—will surely produce more arrests in those 
areas by directing police to patrol them.61 This, in turn, will generate more 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Terry, supra note 19, at 386 (questioning the value of HIPAA/HITECH protections, which 
are “designed to keep unauthorized data aggregators out of our medical records,” when Big Data 
“allows the creation of surrogate profiles of our medical selves”); see Modifications to the HIPAA 
Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) 
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). In addition to circumventing protected domains entire-
ly, Big Data may also benefit from one of a number of carve-outs to traditionally protected 
HIPAA/HITECH domains. Terry, supra note 19, at 408. For example, the Big Data task of “run-
ning data analytics against a hospital’s [Electronic Medical Records] data” in order to “look[] for 
disease predictors” may be categorized as a “quality improvement under ‘health care operations,’” 
and therefore be exempt from regulation. Id. 
 58 See Zach Friend, Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime, FBI L. EN-
FORCEMENT BULL. (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforce
ment-bulletin/2013/April/predictive-policing-using-technology-to-reduce-crime, archived at http://
perma.cc/D8GC-2EDC. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Cf. Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Hu-
man Mobility, SCI. REP., Mar. 25, 2013 at 1, 1, http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130325/srep
01376/pdf/srep01376.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BUS5-26VS (explaining how Big Data can 
re-identify mobile phone data to track individuals). Existing databases such as historical crime 
data enhance Big Data’s ability to connect individuals with the available information. Andrew G. 
Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 317 (2012). 
 61 Ferguson, supra note 60, at 265–85 (explaining predictive policing models). 
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“historical crime data” for those areas and increase the likelihood of pa-
trols.62 For those who live there, these “hot spots” may well become as 
much PII as other demographic information.63 
Law enforcement’s use of Big Data in other ways may similarly lead 
to abuse. Similar analytics are used in “fusion centers,” —information hubs 
created by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. De-
partment of Justice to share personal data held by such agencies as the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the military.64 
This aggregation of various agencies’ data allows law enforcement to pre-
dict or flag individuals as suspicious or worthy of investigation, search, or 
detention based on the agency’s outlined criteria.65 As two scholars note, 
this method may sometimes lead to erroneous results: 
In one case, Maryland state police exploited their access to fusion 
centers to conduct surveillance of human rights groups, peace activ-
ists, and death penalty opponents over a nineteen-month period. Fif-
ty-three political activists eventually were classified as “terrorists,” 
including two Catholic nuns and a Democratic candidate for local of-
fice. The fusion center shared these erroneous terrorist classifications 
with federal drug enforcement, law enforcement databases, and the 
National Security Administration, all without affording the innocent 
targets any opportunity to know, much less correct, the record.66 
When combined and constructed into a composite prediction of a per-
son, such analytics have very serious consequences for personal privacy. 
For example, in 2012, in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States 
v. Jones, Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s concurring opinion expressed serious 
concerns about invasions of privacy that could result from direct collection 
of massive amounts of personal data—specifically, the government’s ability 
“to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity,” through means 
such as Global Position System (GPS) monitoring. 67  Such unrestrained 
governmental power may be susceptible to abuse, endanger individuals’ 
right to privacy, and weaken individuals’ trust in government. 
With predictive policing, the government is not only watching and col-
lecting massive amounts of information about individuals, but it is also us-
ing predictive analytics to generate “data that reveal private aspects of iden-
                                                                                                                           
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. 
 64 David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 67 
(2013). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 81 (footnotes omitted). 
 67 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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tity,” which is subject to abuse in similar ways.68 Even the companies de-
signing software for law enforcement reveal that their systems do not nec-
essarily conform to practical or ethical standards.69 As one of these compa-
nies’ former privacy officers has stated, “[G]eeks like me can do stuff like 
this, we can make stuff work—it’s not our job to figure out if it’s right or 
not. We often don’t know.”70 This software can have particularly harmful 
impacts on racial profiling and other avenues of discrimination. Further-
more, it may circumvent the goal of programs designed to promote rehabili-
tation and reincorporation through “Clean Slate” laws. 71  Whereas these 
laws allow certain nonviolent offenders to expunge their criminal records to 
gain better education, employment, and housing opportunities, law en-
forcement’s use of data analytics may resurface these prior convictions.72 
Furthermore, Big Data will likely exacerbate current concerns of pro-
tecting Fourth Amendment rights in light of new technologies. Recently, 
questions about the constitutional limits on public data surveillance, such as 
the GPS tracking at issue in Jones, continue to test the courts’ interpretation 
of Fourth Amendment precedents.73 The generative data-making practices 
of Big Data will only place further strain on these issues because its ap-
proaches to policing and intelligence may be both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively different from the surveillance approaches addressed in Jones.74 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Cf. id. (suggesting that government collection of massive amounts of personal data is sub-
ject to abuse); Kerr & Earle, supra note 52, at 69 (highlighting organizations’ and the govern-
ment’s use of existing personal data and predictive algorithms to extrapolate conclusions unrelated 
to that data). See generally Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 137 (2008) (describing the various methods through which the government may collect data 
about individuals). 
 69 Jordan Robertson, How Big Data Could Help Identify the Next Felon—or Blame the Wrong 
Guy, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-14/
how-big-data-could-help-identify-the-next-felon-or-blame-the-wrong-guy.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/HEQ8-5PNT. 
 70 Id. This privacy officer had worked at Intelius, a company that designs software to predict 
whether an individual will be a felon with minimal data and considerable predictive guesswork. 
Id. Although the software can make accurate predictions, it has also generated some false posi-
tives. Id. 
 71 See Second Chance Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 17501 (Supp. V 2011) (seeking to reduce 
recidivism rates by providing employment, housing, and other assistance to non-violent criminal 
offenders). 
 72 See Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent 
Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 164–74, 198–99 (2011) (stating that criminal convic-
tions bars individuals from various opportunities and that legislation designed to expunge their 
records may decrease recidivism). 
 73 See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956; United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187, 193–94 (3d Cir. 
2013) (considering whether GPS data may be included as evidence if authorities obtained the GPS 
without a warrant). 
 74 Gray & Citron, supra note 64, at 112–24. 
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C. Predictive Privacy Harms Threaten to Marginalize  
Traditional Privacy Protections 
In light of these predictive privacy harms, it is worth considering what an 
appropriate set of privacy protections might be to address them. Traditionally, 
American civil privacy protections have focused on regulating three main activ-
ities: information collection, processing, and disclosure. 75 For example, the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) prohibits the unau-
thorized collection of communications content;76 the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
prohibits the use of financial records for certain purposes;77 and the Video Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1988 prohibits the disclosure of video rental records.78 
Big Data has the potential to elude all three of these approaches pri-
marily because of the unpredictable nature of its predictive privacy harms. 
From the perspective of data collection regulations, one cannot assess the 
predictive privacy risks from the collection of a single data point such as a 
single tweet, a single “like” on Facebook, a single web search, or a single 
afternoon drive recorded on a GPS. 79 Regulating collection is hard, and 
regulating predictive analytics is even more difficult. Nor can one necessari-
ly predict when a certain form of information processing will produce pre-
dictive privacy harms. Even disclosure regulations become complicated 
because Big Data systems do not create PII at the point of collection. Often-
times, the data that ends up being personally identifying may not yet exist 
during the most significant data transfers. This is seen in predictive policing 
systems, where numerous data collections and transfers can occur before 
any predictive private harm comes into existence. In fact, it may only be 
after all transfers are complete that the predictions occur. For example, if 
the FBI collected crime data from numerous local law enforcement data-
bases to predict areas likely to house sex offenders, it would be impossible 
to identify the resulting harm when the data transfers occurred. After all, 
Big Data promises to accomplish such previously unattainable tasks. Thus, 
unless one decides that privacy regulations must govern all data ever col-
lected, processed, or disclosed, deciding where and when to draw lines 
around these activities becomes extremely difficult with respect to Big Data 
information practices. 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 484–552 (2006) (detail-
ing these three categories). 
 76 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2711, 3121–3127 (2012). 
 77 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (2012). 
 78 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012), amended by Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258, 126 Stat. 2414 (2013). 
 79 See Terry, supra note 14, at 257–63 (describing the difficulties in applying privacy law to 
Big Data); Schwartz & Solove, supra note 31, at 1845–47 (describing the difficulties of character-
izing Big Data results as PII). 
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Even the anchoring concept of most modern privacy regulations—
PII—may fail to provide a sufficient nexus for future Big Data privacy reg-
ulation. Big Data’s analytics are simply too dynamic and unpredictable to 
determine if and when particular information or analyses will become or 
generate PII. 80 Instead, one may only observe the problem in hindsight, 
such as with predictive policing or in the Target pregnancy case.81 
Moreover, predictive privacy harms may marginalize the broader frame-
works for privacy. For decades, privacy policymakers have relied on a set of 
Fair Information Practice Principles (“FIPPs”) as guidelines for adapting exist-
ing privacy laws and developing new ones, especially in light of new techno-
logical developments or information practices.82 Various versions of the FIPPs 
exist, but in general, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) suggests these core 
principles: (1) notice/awareness; (2) choice/consent; (3) access/participation; 
(4) integrity/security; and (5) enforcement/redress. 83  In February 2012, the 
White House also outlined and released its own FIPPs, which included the 
principles of individual control, transparency, respect for context, security, ac-
cess and accuracy, focused collection, and accountability.84 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 31, at 1845–47. 
 81 See Duhigg, supra note 5, § 6 (Magazine), at 30 (discussing Target’s use of Big Data); 
supra notes 58–74 and accompanying text (describing predictive policing). 
 82 See ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY 1 (2013), http://
bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZBY-5LDP. 
 83 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7–11 (1998), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/exploring-privacy-roundtable-series/
priv-23a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PC3T-XMQQ; see FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING 
CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 11 (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DE92-6R73. 
 84 THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAME-
WORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL 
ECONOMY 1 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/6ZCR-742V. The White House explains its FIPPs in its “Consumer 
Privacy Bill of Rights”: 
— Individual Control: Consumers have a right to exercise control over what personal data 
companies collect from them and how they use it. 
— Transparency: Consumers have a right to easily understandable and accessible infor-
mation about privacy and security practices. 
— Respect for Context: Consumers have a right to expect that companies will collect, use, 
and disclose personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in which con-
sumers provide the data. 
— Security: Consumers have a right to secure and responsible handling of personal data. 
— Access and Accuracy: Consumers have a right to access and correct personal data in us-
able formats, in a manner that is appropriate to the sensitivity of the data and the risk of 
adverse consequences to consumers if the data is inaccurate. 
— Focused Collection: Consumers have a right to reasonable limits on the personal data 
that companies collect and retain. 
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Although the FTC and the White House share some FIPPs, the White 
House’s version includes additional approaches to information regulation 
that attempt to expand the scope of FIPPs, especially in terms of control 
over the information at issue and with more focus on the data’s user and 
categorization. Yet even these broadened principles depend on not only 
knowing which information is considered personal data but also providing 
notice, choice, and control to users ex ante any privacy harm. Privacy law is 
primarily concerned with causality, whereas Big Data is generally a tool of 
correlation.85 This contrast makes FIPPs-style approaches to privacy protec-
tion particularly difficult with respect to Big Data. 
But how does one give notice and get consent for innumerable and 
perhaps even yet-to-be-determined queries that one might run that create 
“personal data”? How does one provide consumers with individual control, 
context, and accountability over such processes? Such difficulties suggest 
that frameworks like FIPPs may fail to regulate predictive privacy harms 
because they focus on data collection and retention while using notice-and-
consent models.86 
As Big Data is versatile, dynamic and unpredictable, traditional no-
tions of privacy that isolate certain categories of information—such as 
PII—to regulate collection, utilization, or disclosure are ill-suited to address 
these emerging risks.87 Even omnibus privacy approaches, such as the Eu-
ropean Union’s “right to be forgotten,” will likely struggle with Big Data’s 
ability to recall or even reconstruct an individual’s personal information 
based on past or present data.88 These types of privacy problems demand a 
                                                                                                                           
— Accountability: Consumers have a right to have personal data handled by companies 
with appropriate measures in place to assure they adhere to the Consumer Privacy Bill 
of Rights. 
Id. 
 85 See, e.g., Rubinstein, supra note 3, at 76 (stating that Big Data relies on correlation instead of 
causation); Gil Press, Big Data News Roundup: Correlation vs. Causation, FORBES (Apr. 19, 2013, 
10:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2013/04/19/big-data-news-roundup-correlation-vs-
causation/, archived at http://perma.cc/5QJQ-LDAC (summarizing various media reports that high-
light Big Data’s use of correlation). 
 86 See Dwork & Mulligan, supra note 52, at 36–38 (explaining why current privacy frame-
works do not adequately address Big Data); Hartzog & Selinger, supra note 46, at 82–83 (stating 
that FIPPs do not adequately address Big Data). 
 87 See Dwork & Mulligan, supra note 52, at 36–38; Natasha Singer, Acxiom Lets Consumers 
See Data It Collects, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, at B6. For example, one notorious data broker, 
Acxiom, now lets customers see and change the data it collects about them individually. Singer, 
supra. Acxiom, however, does not allow them to change the analytics it uses to assess the data for 
sale to marketers. Id. This is a sign that transparency and regulation of individual data collection is 
not likely to serve as an effective gatekeeping function for controlling privacy harms. See id. 
 88 See, e.g., Meg L. Ambrose, It’s About Time: Privacy, Information Life Cycles, and the Right 
to Be Forgotten, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 369, 385–87 (2013) (highlighting concerns about the right 
to be forgotten); Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 90–92, 
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shift in thinking that can approach the problem with the same dynamic and 
flexible capacities that Big Data itself provides. 
II. WHY BIG DATA NEEDS PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
The heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for the elemen-
tary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic govern-
ment must therefore practice fairness; and fairness can rarely be ob-
tained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights. 
—J. Frankfurter89 
As noted in Part I, the power of Big Data analyses to evade or margin-
alize traditional privacy protections and frameworks, its drive to bring visi-
bility to the invisible, and its dynamic and unpredictable nature all present 
challenges to thinking about how privacy and Big Data can coexist. In re-
sponse, this Article proposes an alternative approach—procedural data due 
process. Rather than attempt regulation of personal data collection, use, or 
disclosure ex ante, procedural data due process would regulate the fairness 
of Big Data’s analytical processes with regard to how they use personal data 
(or metadata derived from or associated with personal data) in any adjudica-
tive process, including processes whereby Big Data is being used to deter-
mine attributes or categories for an individual. For example, if a health in-
surance provider used Big Data to determine the likelihood that a customer 
has a certain disease and thus denied coverage on that basis, the customer 
would have a data due process right with regard to that determination. Simi-
larly, if a potential employer used Big Data to predict how honest certain 
job applicants might be, these applicants could then exercise their data due 
process rights.90 
What would such a regulatory process entail? This Part describes some 
of the history of due process in Anglo-American law. This Part then demon-
strates why due process’s embedded values and its traditional procedures in 
                                                                                                                           
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/64-SLRO-88.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/X8HL-EP69 (discussing shortcomings of the European Union’s right to be forgotten). 
As described by the European Commission in its draft General Data Protection Regulation, the “right 
to be forgotten” mandates that, upon the individual’s request, entities that collect or store data must 
delete data pertaining to that individual. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 51–53, COM (2012) 
11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:
2012:0011:FIN:EN:PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/CA2F-L253. 
 89 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 90 See Steve Lohr, Big Data, Trying to Build Better Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2013, at 
BU4 (illustrating how Big Data is used by employers to identify ideal traits in job applicants). 
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courts of law and administrative proceedings may be well-suited for an 
analogous system regulating private use of Big Data to mitigate predictive 
privacy harms. Finally, this Part discusses what procedural data due process 
would involve and some possible implementations. 
A. The Historical Role of Due Process 
Throughout the history of Anglo-American law, procedural due pro-
cess has served as a set of constraints on adjudication—the process of de-
ciding.91 Adjudications are arguably similar to the type of models and de-
terminations that predictive algorithms create based on massive data sets. 
Just as information drives Big Data determinations, so does it drive litiga-
tion, legal strategies, and legal outcomes.92 Law—much like computer code 
and data—has its own information rules that are governed by various 
frameworks, from formal rules like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 
common law and constitutional doctrines such as due process.93 
Our modern conception of due process is derived from two founda-
tional sources. First is the Magna Carta, which understood due process to 
mean that “[n]o freemen shall be taken or {and} imprisoned or disseised or 
exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon 
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or {and} by the law of the 
land.”94 Due process then made its way into the U.S. Constitution as part of 
the Fifth Amendment, which states: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”95 
There are two important components to note here. The first is the pro-
hibition on deprivation. The subjects—life, liberty, and property—are obvi-
ously each broad categories that have, at times, defined the core compo-
nents of citizenship.96 They represent qualitatively the level of seriousness 
that the deprivation must constitute in order to invoke due process protec-
                                                                                                                           
 91 Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 
419–21 (2010). 
 92 See Fredric M. Bloom, Information Lost and Found, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 636, 636 (2012). 
 93 Id. at 640; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 4–8 (2006) (discussing 
code’s role in cyberspace as law and exploring interpretations for lawyers and citizens). 
 94  MAGNA CARTA c. 39 (1215), reprinted in THE GREAT CHARTER: FOUR ESSAYS ON 
MAGNA CARTA AND THE HISTORY OF OUR LIBERTY 132 (1965); see also Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516, 521–25 (1884) (explaining the Magna Carta’s interpretation of due process and 
differentiating it from the Fifth Amendment); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement 
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276–78 (1856) (analogizing “due process of law” to the Magna Car-
ta’s reference to “the law of the land”). 
 95 U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision focused on federal state actions. Id. The Fourteenth 
Amendment also contains a similar clause that extends due process protections to individual state 
actions. Id. amend. XIV. 
 96 See Williams, supra note 91, at 420–22 (noting that each interpretation of due process in-
cludes a focus on life, liberty, and property). 
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tion and reflect the type of harm that we wish to prevent.97 The category of 
liberty is especially important to consider in the context of privacy and pre-
dictive privacy harms. Both John Locke and William Blackstone described 
liberty as an individual’s unabridged natural right to follow his own will.98 
If one considers privacy to be “the right to be let alone” and to have some 
freedom of self-determination and autonomy, then it fits well within the lib-
erty category. 99 Property and other interests are also implicated, especially 
as Big Data analytics are integrated into decisions concerning housing op-
portunities, employment, and credit provisioning.100 Thus, predictive priva-
cy harms seem well-suited for due process protection in terms of the type of 
subject matter covered. 
The second component— “without due process of law” —is a means 
to enforce the probation: a process. But what constitutes this process? What 
are the underlying values that drive it? How would they fare as a means of 
regulating Big Data? 
B. Procedural Due Process in the Courts 
Today, procedural due process generally describes the constitutional 
requirement that any government deprivation of a liberty or property right 
must be preceded—at a minimum—by notice and the opportunity for a 
hearing on the matter before an impartial adjudicator.101 
Historically, this conception of due process comes mainly from two 
landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases: Mathews v. Eldridge102 and Goldberg 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Id. 
 98 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91 (stating that the right to personal liber-
ty is “strictly natural” and “cannot ever be abridged . . . without the explicit permission of the 
laws”); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 284 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1988) (1690) (describing personal liberty as “a liberty to follow [one’s] own Will in all 
things” and “to be under no other restraint but the law of nature”). 
 99 See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 387 (2008) (arguing that 
privacy “safeguards the integrity of our intellectual activities by shielding them from the unwanted 
gaze or interference of others”); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARVARD L. REV. 193, 193 (1890) (defining privacy as “the right to be let alone”). 
 100 See Gray & Citron, supra note 64, at 100 (suggesting there is a right to information priva-
cy based on substantive due process because continuous data collection harms individuals’ self 
development and threatens their fundamental rights). These scholars also note that “the insidious, 
far-reaching and indiscriminate nature of electronic surveillance—and, most important, its capaci-
ty to choke off free human discourse that is the hallmark of an open society—makes it almost, 
although not quite, as destructive of liberty as ‘the kicked-in-door.’” Id. (quoting Anthony Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 388 (1974)). 
 101 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liber-
ty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the 
case.’” (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950))). 
 102 424 U.S. 319, 323–26, 333–35 (1976). 
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v. Kelly.103 In 1970, in Goldberg, the Court held that procedural due process 
required an evidentiary hearing before the government could deprive a per-
son of welfare benefits.104 There, the New York City Department of Social 
Services allowed city caseworkers to terminate payments to welfare recipi-
ents whom they deemed ineligible. After the City terminated the recipients’ 
welfare payments, the recipients could request a post-termination hearing 
challenging the decision.105 The Court nonetheless concluded that this pro-
cedure inadequately protected the welfare recipients’ procedural due pro-
cess rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.106 Writing for the majority, 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. explained the necessity for greater protec-
tion: “For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essen-
tial food, clothing, housing, and medical care.”107 The Court therefore char-
acterized the revocation of a welfare benefit as a governmentally sanctioned 
“grievous loss,” which required the government to afford the individual cer-
tain procedural protections of due process before this loss.108 The state need 
not resort to a complete judicial or quasi-judicial trial in order to satisfy due 
process.109 Instead, the state must—at minimum—provide the potentially 
aggrieved party with the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and 
in a meaningful manner; adequate notice; the opportunity to present wit-
nesses; and the ability to present arguments and evidence.110 Thus, Gold-
berg set a fairly high procedural bar for any action that could deprive an 
individual of a property or liberty interest.111 
In 1976, in Mathews, the Court retreated somewhat from this position 
when it addressed the Social Security Act’s policy for the termination of 
disability benefits.112 In many ways, this case was similar to Goldberg: in 
both cases, the state had deprived an individual of some government benefit 
                                                                                                                           
 103 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 257–60. 
 106 Id. at 263–64. 
 107 Id. at 264. 
 108 Id. at 263 (quoting McGrath, 341 U.S. at 168). 
 109 Id. at 266. 
 110 Id. at 267–68. 
 111 See id. 
 112 424 U.S. at 323–26, 333–35 (differentiating its due process requirements in Goldberg from 
other decisions based on Goldberg’s facts). According to the Social Security Act, disabled work-
ers bore the burden to prove their entitlement to benefits by showing that they were unable to 
perform their previous work—or any other gainful employment—because of a disability. Id. at 
323–26. Local state agencies would review the evidence provided and make continuing determi-
nations as to the worker’s eligibility for aid. Id. If the agency felt that an aid recipient no longer 
qualified for disability relief, it would inform the recipient and the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) and provide both with a summary of the relevant evidence. Id. The SSA would then make a 
final determination; if the SSA terminated disability benefits, the recipient had the opportunity for 
a thorough review hearing. Id. 
2014] Using Procedural Due Process to Redress Big Data’s Privacy Harms 113 
without the opportunity for a pre-termination hearing.113 But the Court in 
Mathews concluded that the termination of disability payments did not re-
quire the same pre-termination hearing as the termination of welfare pay-
ments: “The private interest that will be adversely affected by an erroneous 
termination of benefits is likely to be less in the case of a disabled worker 
than in the case of a welfare recipient.”114 The Court relied upon its per-
ceived difference in the financial burden of termination between disability 
aid recipients and welfare recipients. 115  Furthermore, the countervailing 
state interest in fiscal prudence and efficiency outweighed the potential for 
erroneous and harmful deprivation, thereby making additional procedural 
protections constitutionally unnecessary.116 
To soften the supposedly stringent requirements of Goldberg, the 
Court in Mathews established a test for determining what courts must con-
sider when judging the constitutionality of the deprivation.117 This test con-
sisted of balancing three factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.118 
Although Mathews shows that the level of due process required differs ac-
cording to the gravity of the deprivation and the magnitude of the countervail-
ing state interest, most cases over time have established four distinct procedural 
requirements that apply when the state deprives an individual of a state interest. 
Those requirements include (1) participatory procedures (i.e., the affected party 
is present); (2) a neutral arbiter; (3) prior process (i.e., the hearing precedes the 
adverse action); and (4) continuity (i.e., the hearing rights attach at all stag-
es).119 As this Article later discusses, these elements may be useful to address 
Big Data’s privacy harms. 
                                                                                                                           
 113 Compare id. (allowing the disability aid recipient to appeal the SSA’s termination of aid 
only after the SSA had made a final determination), with Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 257–60 (allowing 
the welfare recipient to appeal SSA’s termination of payments only after the agency had made a 
final determination). 
 114 424 U.S. at 334–35. 
 115 Id. at 342 (noting that despite the significant hardship that termination may impose on a 
disability recipient, the hardship is more significant for welfare recipients). 
 116 See id. at 339–43. 
 117 Id. at 335. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533; Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542. 
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1. Eleven Elements of a Due Process “Hearing” 
In addition to Supreme Court precedent, another valuable source for 
identifying elements of procedural due process is the seminal 1971 article, 
Some Kind of Hearing, by Judge Henry Friendly.120 Similar to the balancing 
test in Mathews, Judge Friendly emphasizes that there is no specific check-
list of required procedures.121 Rather, the appropriate process should con-
sider and select a set of potentially useful procedures based on the charac-
teristics of the particular matter, such as the severity of the deprivation and 
the government interest at stake.122 He also notes that civil procedural due 
process has moved beyond regulatory areas such as disability and welfare123 
For example, in 1959, in Greene v. McElroy, the Supreme Court held that 
the government had violated an organization’s due process rights when the 
government identified it as Communist and subversive without an oppor-
tunity to be heard.124 
The recognition of these “stigmatic” liberty interests was a key turning 
point in the expansion of civil procedural due process in the American 
courts.125 Moreover, it has profound implications for data due process be-
cause predictive privacy harms often have the potential for stigmatic results. 
For instance, recent practices in commercial aviation illustrate similar viola-
tions of due process as those in Greene. 126 The similarities between the 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 passim (1975). 
 121 Id. at 1268–70. 
 122 Id. at 1269–70. In describing the flexibility of the common law “fair procedure” require-
ment, Judge Friendly provided: 
The common law requirement of a fair procedure does not compel formal proceed-
ings with all the embellishments of a court trial . . . nor adherence to a single mode 
of process. It may be satisfied by any one of a variety of procedures which afford a 
fair opportunity for an applicant to present his position. As such, this court should 
not attempt to fix a rigid procedure that must invariably be observed. Instead, the as-
sociations themselves should retain the initial and primary responsibility for devis-
ing method which provides an applicant adequate notice of the “charges” against 
him and a reasonable opportunity to respond. 
Id. at 1270 n.10 (quoting Pinsker v. Pac. Coast Soc’y of Orthodontists, 526 P.2d 253, 263–64 (Cal. 
1974) (en banc)). 
 123 Id. at 1273. Judge Friendly also pointed to cases involving public education. Id. at 1274–
75 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); 
Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). For instance, in 1972, in Perry v. 
Sindermann, the Supreme Court held that a public institution could not dismiss a professor with-
out a hearing if he had tenure or if the dismissal would impair his ability to obtain future employ-
ment. 408 U.S. at 596. 
 124 360 U.S. 474, 507–08 (1959); Friendly, supra note 120, at 1273. 
 125 See Friendly, supra note 120, at 1274–75. 
 126 Compare 360 U.S. at 507–08 (holding that governmental labeling of an organization as 
Communist and subversive without an opportunity to be heard was a due process violation), with 
Danielle K. Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1256 (2008) (noting 
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harms addressed by due process in Greene and the errors and mistaken as-
sumptions that have been revealed about the Transportation Security Ad-
ministration’s “No Fly” list—another product of Big Data—further support 
the need for data due process.127 
On the other hand, as Judge Friendly notes, it is important to recognize 
a balance between protecting individual rights through due process and 
providing the costly administrative measures to do so.128 Accordingly, simi-
lar onerous costs should not be imposed on Big Data providers because they 
would slow down the process of administering justice as well as encourage 
harassment and game-playing. This balance of protection with cost will also 
itself be dynamic and thus better considered as a standard than a rule—yet 
another reason why a due process approach is well-suited for Big Data.129 
So, what kind of hearing is required for data due process? Judge 
Friendly writes that the affected party must receive an opportunity to pre-
sent an argument, evidence, and corrections to prejudice.130 In this regard, 
the required level of procedural safeguards varies directly with the im-
portance of the affected private interest, the need for that particular safe-
guard in the given circumstances, and its utility.131 Furthermore, it varies 
inversely with the administrative burden and any other adverse consequenc-
                                                                                                                           
that “[e]very week, approximately 1,500 airline travelers reportedly are mislabeled as terrorists 
due to errors in the data-matching program known as the ‘No Fly’ list”). 
 127 Citron, supra note 126, at 1256. Although some due process cases have held that reputa-
tional harms are more appropriate for the province of tort law, due process can apply when reputa-
tion leads to deprivation of liberty or property. Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699–701 
(1976) (denying due process claim over stigmatic harm related to future employment opportunities 
stemming from inclusion in a flyer of “active shoplifters”), with Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 
U.S. 433, 436–37 (1971) (holding that a ban on distributing alcoholic drinks to persons whose 
names were “posted” as excessive drinkers was a deprivation of liberty because it altered or extin-
guished a distinct right previously recognized by state law). 
 128 Friendly, supra note 120, at 1276 (“[A]t some point the benefit to individuals from an 
additional [procedural] safeguard is substantially out-weighed by the cost of providing such pro-
tection, and that the expense of protecting those likely to be found undeserving will probably 
come out of the pockets of the deserving.”). 
 129 See Citron, supra note 126, at 1301–03 (discussing the tension between standards and 
rules). 
 130 See Friendly, supra note 120, at 1277 (“A hearing in its very essence demands that he who 
is entitled to it shall have the right to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if 
need be, by proof, however informal.” (quoting Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908))). 
To support his view, Judge Friendly referenced such authority as Justice Felix Frankfurter’s con-
curring opinion in McGrath, that “even in the case of ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss,’ that 
one must be given ‘notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.’” Id. (quoting 341 
U.S. at 171–72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Judge Friendly further relied upon English common 
law, which characterized due process as “a fair opportunity . . . for correcting or contradicting any 
relevant statement prejudicial to [one’s] view.” Id. (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rice, [1911] A.C. 
179, 182). 
 131 Id. at 1278. 
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es.132 To offset this balancing test’s uncertainty, Judge Friendly suggests that 
“more elaborate specification of the relevant factors may help to produce 
more principled and predictable decisions.”133 It is this sense of principle 
and predictability that inspires this Article to bring due process to Big Data 
and its potential privacy harms. 
Having laid out his general vision of due process hearings, Judge Friendly 
then goes on to enunciate eleven potential elements of a hearing that may help 
ensure a fair process. Not all are required, he states, but all are worth considera-
tion depending on the circumstances at issue. They are: (1) an unbiased tribu-
nal;134 (2) notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it;135 (3) 
an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action should not be tak-
en;136 (4) the right to call witnesses;137 (5) the right to know the evidence 
against oneself;138 (6) the right to have the decision based only on the evidence 
presented;139 (7) the right to counsel;140 (8) the making of a record;141 (9) a 
statement of reasons;142 (10) public attendance;143 and (11) judicial review.144 
Not all of these eleven elements would fit a data due process, of 
course. The right to call witnesses, for example, would be difficult and po-
tentially cumbersome given how Big Data systems perform their analyt-
                                                                                                                           
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 1279 (“Although an unbiased tribunal is a necessary element in every case where a 
hearing is required, sharp disagreement can arise over how much in the way of prior participation 
constitutes bias.”). 
 135 Id. at 1280–81 (“It is likewise fundamental that notice be given and that it be timely and 
clearly inform the individual of the proposed action and the grounds for it.”). 
 136 Id. at 1281. 
 137 Id. at 1282 (“Under most conditions there does not seem to be any disposition to deny the 
right to call witnesses, although the tribunal must be entitled reasonably to limit their number and 
the scope of examination.”). 
 138 Id. at 1283–87 (noting disagreement as to whether “the right to know the nature of the 
evidence on which the administrator relies” applies only to criminal cases or to cases including 
administrative and regulatory actions). 
 139 Id. at 1284–87 (discussing the necessity to grant an opportunity to confront all evidence 
and witnesses). 
 140 Id. at 1287–91 (emphasizing the importance of counsel’s role “to advance his client’s 
cause by any ethical means”). 
 141 Id. at 1291–92 (highlighting the importance of a record but cautioning against “the sheer 
problem of warehousing these mountains of papers”). 
 142 Id. (finding a written statement of reasons necessary for purposes of judicial review; to 
provide for justification as a powerful preventive of wrong decisions; to encourage uniformity 
across decision-making bodies; and to make decisions somewhat more acceptable to a losing 
claimant). 
 143 Id. at 1293–94 (citing three principal reasons for the right to an open trial as a part of due 
process: (1) fostering public confidence in the outcome; (2) helping to assure the accuracy of the 
evidence offered; and (3) placing pressure on the presiding officials to conduct the proceedings 
fairly). Judge Friendly, however, acknowledges that public attendance can also be disruptive in 
certain contexts such as prison disciplinary hearings. Id. 
 144 Id. at 1294–95 (suggesting that judicial review be limited to questions of fair procedure). 
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ics. 145 On the other hand, elements such as “an unbiased tribunal,” “the 
right to know the evidence against one,” “the making of a record,” and “a 
statement of reasons” make more sense for data due process. For example, 
rather than focusing—as FIPPs do—on the right to audit the personal data 
that has been collected about oneself generally, data due process would spe-
cifically focus on the right to audit the data used to make the determination 
at issue. Moreover, although both FIPPs and due process describe the con-
cept of “notice” as critical, due process’s notice focuses on the proposed 
action to be taken against the individual, rather than the type and amount of 
data to be collected or used—as is FIPPs focus. Again, because it is hard to 
predict in advance what processes or queries will be conducted by Big Data, 
due process’s required notice of a proposed action fits Big Data’s information 
practices better than FIPPs’ approach to gatekeeping at the collection stage.146 
An unbiased tribunal and judicial review would also be appropriate for 
data due process. Algorithmic bias is a serious issue, and there should be 
means for challenging it.147 Because predictive privacy harms are often only 
discernable in hindsight, it may make sense to provide for some agency or 
judicial oversight when they occur. This oversight would only apply to data 
due process and not to the actual result, ensuring that the reviews would be 
fairly standardized and that the growing expertise of the agency or court 
performing these reviews would promote efficiency over the long-term. 
2. The Nature of the Action 
To address how the nature of the government action should influence 
the due process requirements, Judge Friendly argues that the greater the se-
riousness of the deprivation to the individual, the more protections should 
be in place.148 For example, taking action against a citizen is far more seri-
ous than simply denying a citizen’s request.149 Among the deprivations he 
ranks as deserving the most procedural protection, Judge Friendly includes 
revocation of parole or probation, civil commitment, warrants, and revoca-
tion of a professional license.150 He also suggests that gradations in depriva-
tion matter: 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See Friendly, supra note 120, at 1282. 
 146 See Citron, supra note 126, at 1305–06 (articulating that current notice is inadequate and 
suggesting improvements that mirror the notice requirements of other countries). 
 147 Id. at 1262 (discussing possibility that programmers may distort policy with own biases 
when tasked with devising code to achieve policy’s goals). 
 148 See Friendly, supra note 120, at 1295–1304. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 1296–98. 
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Thus a welfare termination is more serious than a reduction; sus-
pension of a payment that is the claimant’s only hope for income 
is more serious than a suspension that permits resort to other 
sources of income, even to the welfare system; expulsion from 
public housing is more serious than transfer to a smaller apart-
ment; expulsion from a school is more serious than suspension or 
loss of credit; severance from government service is graver than 
suspension pending a further hearing; dismissal on a ground car-
rying a moral stigma is more serious than on one that does not; 
some types of discipline are more onerous than others.151 
In terms of data due process, the type of predictive privacy harm 
should similarly influence the due process requirements. The greater the 
stigma or seriousness of the determination, the greater right one should have 
to question how Big Data adjudicated that result. For example, health in-
formation is among the most precious and protected, so more due process 
would be afforded to determinations in this field. Law enforcement uses 
would also be among those most subject to more scrutiny. Advertising 
might be on the lesser end of scrutiny. For mixed uses, such as the Target 
pregnancy example, which may be categorized as both advertising and 
health information, the greater protection should govern.152 
C. The Underlying Values of Due Process 
To further assess the appropriateness of a due process approach to Big 
Data, it is worth considering the values that underlie many due process 
rules. As Martin Redish and Larry Marshall have noted, due process’s val-
ues remain more consistent than its procedures.153 Application of due pro-
cess to data requires significant imagination to design the appropriate pro-
cesses and procedures. The large computational use of data will be varied 
and contextual (much like the range of cases that courts consider). Accord-
ingly, a flexible model based more on values and less on specific procedures 
will be more likely to endure over time.154 
                                                                                                                           
 151  Id. at 1298 (footnotes omitted) (noting the impossibility of implementing a universal 
scale). 
 152 See Duhigg, supra note 5, § 6 (Magazine), at 30 (discussing the Target example). 
 153 Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of 
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 474 (1986). Redish and Marshall stress that a proce-
dural due process model should have flexible procedural mechanisms that maintain the due pro-
cess clause’s long-existing values. Id. 
 154 See id. at 474–75. 
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In their examination of due process, Redish and Marshall set out seven 
enduring sets of values that due process should preserve: (1) accuracy;155 
(2) the appearance of fairness;156 (3) equality of inputs into the process;157 
(4) predictability, transparency, and rationality; 158 (5) participation; 159 (6) 
revelation;160 and (7) privacy-dignity.161 
Each of these values maps well to our concerns about Big Data. For 
Big Data to deliver the answers we seek, it must be accurate and include all 
appropriate inputs equally to overcome any signal problems. Otherwise, Big 
Data may provide us with misleading conclusions.162 Furthermore, before 
Big Data’s role in decision making can gain greater social acceptance—
especially within government—it must not only appear fair but also have an 
acceptable degree of predictability, transparency, and rationality. Without 
these values, we cannot trust Big Data to be part of governance.163 Finally, 
participation, revelation, and privacy-dignity would help optimize Big Da-
ta’s role in public decision making for the same reasons they optimize the 
judicial or administrative process by bringing legitimacy to the process, al-
beit through different approaches. These values address the individual’s 
concern about the procedural process, even in spite of unfavorable out-
comes.164 
                                                                                                                           
 155 Id. at 476–81 (explaining procedural mechanisms such as an independent adjudicator and 
right to counsel to ensure accuracy). 
 156 Id. at 483–84. (characterizing an appearance of fairness via an independent adjudicator as 
the flip side of the accuracy value because it fosters trust in the adjudicatory process). 
 157 Id. at 484–85 (emphasizing the importance of procedural fairness to ensure that a party’s 
identity does not affect the adjudicatory process). 
 158 Id. at 485–86 (reasoning that due process’s predictability, transparency and rationality 
allow individuals to plan rationally and make informed decisions). 
 159 Id. at 487–89 (attributing the value of participation to individual psychological benefits 
and societal benefits); see Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (specifying “the 
promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the [decision-making] process” 
as a central concern of procedural due process). 
 160 Redish & Marshall, supra note 153, at 489–91 (noting that, although this value is more 
introspective than others, it is pivotal to preserving individual dignity and understanding). 
 161 Id. at 491 (suggesting that the Supreme Court acknowledges individual physical and men-
tal privacy, but stating that this value restricts due process’s procedural mechanisms). 
 162 See, e.g., Declan Butler, When Google Got Flu Wrong, 494 NATURE 155, 155–56 (2013) 
(explaining Google Flu Trends’ faulty overestimation when it used Big Data to determine peak flu 
levels and the effects of mistaken reliance on its analysis); Kate Crawford, The Hidden Biases in 
Big Data, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 1, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2013/04/the_hidden_
biases_in_big_data.html, archived at http://perma.cc/B3U8-K67A (discussing Big Data’s signal 
problems in such scenarios as analysis of GPS data to detect potholes). 
 163 See generally Kate Crawford & Catherine Lumby, Networks of Governance: Users, Plat-
forms, and the Challenges of Networked Media Regulation, 1 INT’L J. TECH. POL’Y & LAW 270 
(2013). By the term “governance,” we are referring primarily to networked or technological gov-
ernance, which involves both governmental aspects as well as private and individual ones. Id. 
 164 Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Proce-
dural Justice, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 171–73 (2005) (highlighting “the ability to tell 
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Redish and Marshall also raise two cautionary concerns about what 
they consider to be the centerpiece of any due process framework—the in-
dependent adjudicator. Specifically, they highlight the dangers that arise 
when an adjudicator has either a direct financial interest in the proceeding’s 
outcome or an inherent personal bias.165 There can be no doubt that for-
profit providers of Big Data analytics have direct financial interests in some 
of the outputs they produce. Furthermore, as we note in another article, is-
sues of bias also exist within Big Data’s algorithms and data sets, despite 
their appearance of objectivity.166 These present two additional reasons to 
apply due process to these data regimes. 
D. Due Process as Separation of Powers and Systems Management 
Due process’s historical role as a means of separating powers among 
governments is another favorable reason to consider it as a mechanism to 
address how Big Data handles personal information. Due process has en-
sured that those who pass general laws are kept separate from both those 
who are called upon to enforce them in specific circumstances, and those 
who judge whether or not those cases have merit. As two scholars write, 
this protects citizens against directed executive punishment in the form of 
adjudication. 167 Congress may pass laws affecting our lives, liberty, and 
property, and the President may sign them, but their enforcement requires a 
fair process overseen by a neutral arbiter.168 Thus, a core function of due 
process is to separate those who write the legal code from adjudicators who 
use it.169 
With many Big Data determinations, there is little or no regulation of 
the interactions among the algorithm’s designer (the lawmaker), the person 
who oversees the queries (the executive), and the adjudicator (the computa-
tional output). Accordingly, there is no system of checks and balances to 
ensure that biases are not present in the system, which is especially crucial 
to a system of enforcement. As Chief Justice John Marshall has explained: 
“It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for 
the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in 
                                                                                                                           
one’s story” and “dignified, respectful treatments” as significant dimensions of due process to 
individuals, regardless of the adjudicatory process’s outcome). 
 165 Redish & Marshall, supra note 153, at 494–505. 
 166 See Crawford, supra note 162; Kate Crawford, Think Again: Big Data, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(May 9, 2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/09/think_again_big_data, archived 
at http://perma.cc/67SQ-5BXK. 
 167 Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Power, 121 
YALE L.J. 1672, 1782–92 (2012). 
 168 Id. at 1677–1726 (discussing the evolution of how due process acts as a separation of 
powers). 
 169 Id. 
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society would seem to be the duty of other departments.”170 Due process 
would help ensure that Big Data does not blur its processes with its prov-
inces. 
Various due process scholars have also conceptualized the doctrine as 
a form of systematic management technique that should focus less on any 
individual harm and more on discovering errors, identifying their causes, 
and implementing corrective actions. 171 Or, as one scholar suggests, alt-
hough due process should address injustices individually, it should look be-
yond them to the managerial level by creating schemes and incentives to 
normatively circumscribe government actions within the bounds of law.172 
Similarly, due process can serve as a systematic management technique for 
Big Data by uncovering errors, identifying their causes, and providing 
schemes and incentives to correct them while keeping within the bounds of 
privacy laws and norms. 
III. TOWARD A MODEL FOR DATA DUE PROCESS 
A. Technological Due Process: The Citron Analysis 
The general idea of applying due process to automated systems is not 
new.173 In her 2010 article, Technological Due Process, Danielle Citron ex-
amines the use of automated systems in governmental administrative pro-
ceedings, the risks they pose to deprivations of liberty and property, and 
how a reinvigorated approach to due process could help mitigate and ad-
                                                                                                                           
 170 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810); see Chapman & McConnell, supra 
note 167, at 1733 (emphasizing the importance of applying the laws equally to all people; suggest-
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dress these problems.174 Citron’s approach could be expanded to address the 
predictive privacy harms of Big Data. 
First, Citron identifies various automated systems that government 
administrative officials use to adjudicate individual liberty or property in-
terests. 175 These include systems that terminate Medicaid, food stamps, and 
other welfare benefits; target people for exclusion from air travel; identify 
parents who neglect child support payments; purge voters from rolls with-
out notice; and deem small businesses ineligible for federal contracts.176 
She also notes that most of these systems (1) have failed to give adequate 
notice to individuals whose interests were at stake; (2) have failed to pro-
vide any opportunity to be heard before a decision was rendered; and (3) 
have often adjudicated the case in secrecy or without leaving any record for 
audits or judicial review.177 
In particular, Citron notes that automatic systems generally fail to give any 
or adequate notice to individuals when their liberty or property interests are 
algorithmically adjudicated.178 In administrative proceedings, notice of an ac-
tion against one’s liberty interest should “be ‘reasonably calculated’ to inform 
. . . affected individuals of the issues to be decided, the evidence supporting the 
government’s position, and the agency’s decisional process.”179 When affected 
individuals do not receive this adequate notice, they lack sufficient information 
to respond effectively to the claim.180 As Citron writes, clear notice should de-
crease the likelihood that agency action will rely on false premises, misleading 
presumptions, or misapplication of rules.181 To counteract this failure to give 
notice, Citron argues that automated administrative systems must include audit 
trails that record the facts and rules supporting each decision.182 This trail can 
then be compiled into some form of sufficient notice when a decision is made, 
and subsequently transmitted to the affected individual.183 
Big Data systems suffer from many of the same weaknesses as gov-
ernment administration systems regarding notice. Individuals or groups that 
are subjected to predictive privacy harms rarely receive any meaningful no-
tice of the predictions before they occur or are implemented; and even then, 
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providers are unlikely to share the evidence and reasoning for the predic-
tions that were made. Notably, there is currently no legal requirement that 
providers archive any audit trail or retain any record of the basis of the pre-
diction. 
Opportunities to be heard also present problems for automated systems 
and due process.184 Citron posits that an “opportunity to be heard” in a Big 
Data context would involve access to an automated program’s source code 
or a hearing on the logic of a computer program’s decision, and it would 
often be found far too expensive under the Mathews balancing test.185 She 
notes, however, that because such challenges would encourage fairness in 
future cases, it might be worth pursuing an opportunity to be heard even 
under Mathews.186 
To better adapt due process application to automated systems, Citron 
proposes several changes. She suggests first that instead of subjecting every 
automated system to cross-examination, one could—at a minimum— invest 
in extra education about the biases and fallacies of automation for govern-
ment personnel who use the systems to make administrative decisions.187 
Educating these individuals about the systems’ flaws could help them scru-
tinize the outputs more fairly.188 Second, she suggests that agencies should 
require hearing officers “to explain, in detail, their reliance on an automated 
system’s decision,” including any computer-generated facts or legal find-
ings.189 Third, she suggests that agencies should be required to regularly test 
their system’s software for bias and other errors.190 
For Big Data adjudications, many of these same problems exist with 
algorithmic biases and the potential to inaccurately predict PII about indi-
viduals. Thus, similar opportunities to be heard may well be appropriate, 
especially with respect to educating data scientists about the biases of Big 
Data, requiring those who use Big Data for significant decisions concerning 
individuals to disclose which data sets were used, and requiring testing of 
predictive analytics to assess how accurate a given system can be. 
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Finally, Citron discusses what meaningful judicial review for automat-
ed systems might entail and why most of these systems evade it.191 Specifi-
cally, she critiques automated administrative systems because they often fail 
to retain any audit record of how they made the decisions at issue or upon 
what data the decision was based.192 Again, similar to the need for notice, 
Big Data may benefit from an audit trail because it provides reassurance 
and increases accuracy. Access to audit trails would also allow individuals 
to raise specific objections to how and when their data is being used in vari-
ous processes. 
B. Procedural Data Due Process 
As noted above, procedural due process generally describes the consti-
tutional requirement that any government deprivation of a liberty or proper-
ty right must be preceded—at a minimum—by notice and the opportunity 
for a hearing on the matter before an impartial adjudicator. In thinking 
about procedural data due process, this Section will draw from these same 
three elements, while incorporating aspects of Judge Friendly’s list of elev-
en, and Redish and Marshall’s values of due process.193 
To begin, some uses of Big Data will be difficult to fit in the mold of 
individualized due process adjudication. These uses include the opportuni-
ties individuals were not selected for, the advantageous insurance advertis-
ing offers that did not appear in their search results, and the jobs they never 
knew existed because they didn’t fit the desired profile of a marketer. But 
when individuals are aware of or directly involved in processes in which 
Big Data is used as part of the outcome, such as when it is used to identify 
top candidates from a given pool of applicants, individualized due process 
approaches will seem most appropriate. For the more opaque predictive 
problems—including missed opportunities, such as a real estate offer one 
never sees because Big Data might have judged one unworthy—a more 
structural due process approach might be better, with oversight and auditing 
primarily driven by public agencies. An alternative could be granted in the 
form of a remedial tort, with standing and statutory damages for those 
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whose rights have been violated, like the scheme set forth in the ECPA.194 
This could also include class certification and association standing options. 
Another key question arises as to when due process should attach to a 
particular decision. Although the exact moment for any particular decision 
is too specific for this Article to discuss, one can imagine that certain de-
terminations, like determinations of employment eligibility, will be more 
regularized and repetitive.195 Thus, due process could attach at the moment 
the decision is made to determine the specific eligibility of a particular set 
of individuals. The moment of attachment could also be triggered sooner as 
the generated data approaches the equivalent of PII. The more closely Big 
Data resembles PII-type information, the stronger the case for attaching 
procedural data due process. In addition, the greater the seriousness of the 
decision, the more Big Data due process is afforded. With these questions in 
mind, the remainder of this Section turns to principles for implementation. 
1. Notice 
Our conception of notice for procedural data due process centers on 
providing those who may suffer from predictive privacy harms an oppor-
tunity to intervene in the predictive process. This opportunity ensures fair-
ness with respect to the processes that affect their interests, either individu-
ally or structurally. Our approach would require those who use Big Data to 
“adjudicate” others—i.e., those who make categorical or attributive deter-
minations—to post some form of notice, disclosing not only the type of 
predictions they attempt, but also the general sources of data that they draw 
upon as inputs, including a means whereby those whose personal data is 
included can learn of that fact. 
One could also imagine a variety of notice rights and obligations that 
would enable consumers to petition Big Data providers to check and see if 
their data was being included or used in any predictive adjudications, and 
whether that data was accurate. Similar laws are available for data collec-
tion.196 These models could be expanded to include data processing for Big 
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Data so that, like privacy policies disclosing data collection practices, they 
would disclose data prediction practices “reasonably calculated” to inform 
individuals of the risks to which they may be exposed in terms of predictive 
privacy harms. Moreover, when a particular set of predictions about an in-
dividual or discrete group has been queried (or “adjudicated”), notice would 
be sent out that is “reasonably calculated” to inform those affected of, at a 
minimum, the issues that were predicted, and ideally, the data considered 
and the methodology employed. At a minimum, this notice should provide 
for a mechanism to access the audit trail or record created in the predictive 
process.197 
For example, if a company were to license search query data from 
Google and Bing in order to predict which job applicants would be best 
suited for a particular position, it would have to disclose to all applicants 
that it uses search queries for predictive analytics related to their candidacy. 
Or in the case of predictive policing, the government would have to notify 
citizens that it was using predictive analytics and particular sets of public 
records to determine which areas of a city it marked as “hot spots” as well 
as its capacity to determine if one lived or worked within the actual hot 
spots. 
Another example would focus on the issue of fair housing. If landlords 
and real estate companies were to shift away from general advertising in 
media outlets and toward using Big Data to determine likely buyers or 
renters who fit their “ideal” profiles, we could, again, require them to dis-
close this practice. Depending on the specifics of the practice, one could 
imagine the notice either on an individual level—to those who knew of their 
inclusion in the predictions—or on a structural level, if the predictions were 
for a large set of a given population. 
2. Opportunity for a Hearing 
Once notice is available, the question then becomes how one might 
challenge the fairness of the predictive process employed. We believe that 
the most robust mechanism for this is the opportunity to be heard and, if 
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necessary, correct the record. This would include examining the evidence 
used, including both the data input and the algorithmic logic applied. In 
contexts in which security and proprietary concerns arise—or in more struc-
tural situations—this role could be given to a trusted third party who would 
act as a neutral data arbiter to routinely examine Big Data providers whose 
adjudications give rise to predictive privacy harms. For example, the FTC—
which currently addresses many privacy harms involving technology and 
has recently hired technologists to assist its investigations and enforcement 
actions—could investigate complaints based on predictive privacy harms 
and, in the process of those complaints, investigate the basis of the predic-
tions.198 
The presence of a neutral data arbiter would provide the public with an 
opportunity to be heard, to examine the evidence used in adjudicative pre-
dictions, and to challenge it. This approach would also comport with several 
of the underlying values of due process: accuracy of the determination; ap-
pearance of fairness; predictability, transparency, and rationality; participa-
tion; and revelation. In particular, because Big Data generally excludes any 
user participation in its decision making, a neutral data arbiter would be 
especially important to ensure that there was a meaningful hearing for pub-
lic concerns. 
3. Impartial Adjudicator and Judicial Review 
One of the primary myths about Big Data is that it produces outputs 
that are somehow free from bias and closer to objective truth than other 
forms of knowledge.199 Due process requires that those who deprive indi-
viduals of a liberty interest do so without unwarranted bias or direct finan-
cial interest in the outcome. Procedural data due process, therefore, can also 
serve as a valuable framework for ensuring greater fairness with predictive 
analytics. A neutral data arbiter could field complaints and investigate suffi-
cient allegations of bias or financial interest that might render the adjudica-
tion unfair. In particular, drawing on the literature exploring due process as 
a function of separation of powers, the arbiter could examine the relation-
ship between those who designed the analytics and those who run the indi-
vidual processes to make sure that their roles are appropriate and distinct. 
This would require some form of audit trail that records the basis of predic-
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tive decisions, both in terms of the data used and the algorithm employed. 
Such audits are already used in various data-mining contexts and, thus, 
would not be unreasonable to require.200 
CONCLUSION 
In concluding his article on hearings, Judge Friendly wrote: “We have 
traveled over wide areas—from termination of welfare payments to the es-
tablishment of incentive per diem for freight cars, from student and prison 
discipline to rates for natural gas. Yet the problem is always the same—to 
devise procedures that are both fair and feasible.”201 This Article ends here 
with the same observation. Big Data presents many challenges for privacy, 
to which this Article posits a model of procedural data due process as a re-
sponse. How exactly it responds to each challenge may vary, but it will ul-
timately succeed if it can ensure protections that are both fair and feasible 
for those at risk from this new form of privacy harm. 
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